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ABSTRACT: After a series of military reforms resulting from
the 2008 conflict with Georgia, Russia used information warfare
operations more effectively in Crimea. Russia’s continued refinement
of its information operations may keep it ahead of the United States.

R

ussia has a long history of propaganda and disinformation
operations—techniques it continues to adapt to the online
environment. As the information space is broader than the
technologies facilitating its use, Russia utilizes broad information-based
efforts classified by effects: information-technical and informationpsychological. A major milestone for these efforts surfaced in 2008 when
pro-Russian cyberattacks occurred concurrently with Russian military
operations in Georgia. During that brief conflict, a resilient Georgia
overtook Russia in the larger information war, forcing Russia to rethink
how it conducts information-based operations.
Russia adjusted its information confrontation strategy six years later
against Ukraine, quickly and bloodlessly reclaiming Crimea and keeping
potentially intervening countries at bay. Clearly, Russia finds value in
manipulating the information space, particularly in an age where news
can be easily accessed on demand through official and nonofficial outlets.
Based on its successes in Crimea, Russia is outpacing its main adversary,
the United States, by leveraging the information space to bolster its
propaganda, messaging, and disinformation capabilities in support of
geopolitical objectives.

Russian Information Confrontation

Russia has been long credited with having formidable information
warfare capabilities.1 Russian information confrontation theory covers
a wide range of these actions and the conceptual understanding of
Russian information operations stemming from cultural, ideological,
historical, scientific, and philosophical viewpoints.2 The broad nature
of these activities views offensive information campaigns more as
influencing agents than as destructive actions, though the two are not
mutually exclusive. Simply put, the information space lends information
resources, including “weapons” or other informational means, to affect
both internal and external audiences through tailored messaging,
disinformation, and propaganda campaigns.
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1      Paul M. Joyal, “Cyber Threats and Russian Information Warfare,” Jewish Policy Center, Winter for domestic and
2016, http://www.jewishpolicycenter.org/2015/12/31/russia-information-warfare/.
international audiences
2      Timothy L. Thomas, “Dialectical versus Empirical Thinking: Ten Key Elements of the based upon his 15 years’
Russian Understanding of Information Operations,” Journal of Slavic Military Studies 11, no. 1 (1998): experience as a strategic
cyberintelligence analyst.
40–62, doi:10.1080/13518049808430328.
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Igor Panarin, an influential scholar and a well-regarded Russian
information warfare expert, outlined the basic instruments involved in
the larger information struggle including propaganda (black, gray, and
white); intelligence (specifically information collection); analysis (media
monitoring and situation analysis); organization (coordinating and
steering channels and influencing media to shape the opinion of politicians
and mass media); and other combined channels.3 In terms of influence
operations, Panarin identified information warfare vehicles such as social
control; social maneuvering; information manipulation; disinformation;
purposeful fabrication of information; and lobbying, blackmail, and
extortion.4 Therefore, the essence of information confrontation focuses
on this constant information struggle between adversaries.
Reviewing the application of these principles in two well-known
instances of Russian geopolitical involvement helps illustrate if and how
Russian understanding of information confrontation has evolved; it also
provides insight into the outcomes of such practices in the context of
on-demand media coverage.

2008 Georgia

Russia and Georgia competed to control the flow of information
to the global community during their brief conflict in 2008. Both sides
employed kinetic (conventional military strikes and troop movements)
and nonkinetic (cyberattacks, propaganda, and denial and deception)
offensives. As reported, Russia’s postanalysis and criticism of its efforts
in the conflict led to some serious military reforms in its larger defense
apparatus.5 Although experts observed alternating mission successes,
Anatoliy Tsyganok, then deputy chief of the General Staff of the
Russian Armed Forces believed Georgia won the information war at
the preliminary stage of the conflict, but lost at the end of it.6

Information-Technical

Russia’s perception of technical and psychological information
confrontation working in concert with military attacks became evident
during the conflict in Georgia. Despite the lack of a substantive
connection between the orchestrators of the cyberattacks and the
Russian government, this nonattributable action was the first time
cyberattacks and conventional military operations had worked together.7
Such attacks included web page defacements, denial of service, and
distributed denial of service attacks against Georgian government,
media, and financial institutions, as well as other public and private
targets.8 The attacks successfully denied citizen access to 54 websites
related to communications, finance, and government, leaving some
3      Jolanta Darczewska, The Anatomy of Russian Information Warfare: The Crimean Operation, A Case
Study, Point of View 42 (Warsaw: Centre for Eastern Studies, May 2014).
4      Ibid.
5      Athena Bryce-Rogers, “Russian Military Reform in the Aftermath of the 2008 Russia-Georgia
War,” Demokratizatsiya: The Journal of Post-Soviet Democratization 21, no. 3 (July 2013): 339–68.
6      Timothy L. Thomas, “Russian Information Warfare Theory: The Consequences of August
2008,” in The Russian Military Today and Tomorrow: Essays in Memory of Mary Fitzgerald, ed. Stephen J.
Blank and Richard Weitz (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2010).
7      David Hollis, “Cyberwar Case Study: Georgia 2008,” Small Wars Journal 7, no. 1 (January 2011).
8      Eneken Tikk, Kadri Kaska, and Liis Vihul, International Cyber Incidents: Legal Considerations
(Tallinn, Estonia: Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence, 2010).
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to speculate at least some Russian complicity even though no hard
connection was made.9

Information-Psychological

Russia also engaged in concurrent information-psychological
operations—including propaganda, information control, and
disinformation campaigns—with varying results, especially in contrast
to Georgia’s efforts in the same areas. Russia focused on delivering key
themes to the international community: Georgia and Mikheil Saakashvili,
its president, were the aggressors; Russia was compelled to defend its
citizens; and neither the United States nor its Western allies had any basis
for criticizing Russia because of similar actions these nations had taken
in other areas of the world, most notably in Kosovo.10
By using television footage and daily interviews with a military
spokesman, Russia controlled the flow of international information
and sought to influence local populations by dictating news, sharing
the progress of Russian troops protecting Russian citizens, and
propagandizing Georgian atrocities.11 A review of Georgian, Russian,
and Western media coverage during this period reveals Russian President
Dmitry Medvedev was perceived as less aggressive than his Georgian
counterpart and had little justification for Russian intervention in South
Ossetia.12 Indeed, a CNN poll conducted at the time found 92 percent
of respondents believed Russia was justified for intervening.13

Why Did Georgia Win the Information War?

Instead of acquiescing to Russia’s information confrontation
over the course of the crisis, Georgians launched an aggressive
counterinformation campaign by employing their own disinformation
and media manipulation.14 Georgia requested assistance from
professional public relations firms and private consultancies to help
promote its message, limited the availability of Russian news coverage,
and reported Russian air raids on civilian targets, thereby becoming the
victim of a Russian military invasion.15
Ultimately, Georgia gained the upper hand in the conflict—a
fact corroborated by Russia’s review of its military’s performance,
which noted deficiencies in both the information-technical and
9      Jon Oltsik, “Russian Cyber Attack on Georgia: Lessons Learned?,” Cybersecurity Snippets
(blog), Network World, August 17, 2009, http://www.networkworld.com/community/node/44448).
10      Ariel Cohen and Robert E. Hamilton, The Russian Military and the Georgia War: Lessons and
Implications (Carlisle, PA: SSI, 2011).
11      Katie Paine, “Reputation Redux: Russia Invades Georgia by Land and by Server,” PR News,
August 25, 2008, http://www.prnewsonline.com/reputation-redux-russia-invades-georgia-by-land
-and-by-server/.
12      Hans-Georg Heinrich and Kirill Tanaev, “Georgia & Russia: Contradictory Media Coverage
of the August War,” Caucasian Review of International Affairs 3, no. 3 (Summer 2009).
13      Yasha Levine, “The CNN Effect: Georgia Schools Russia in Information Warfare,” The
eXiled Online, August 13, 2008, http://exiledonline.com/the-cnn-effect-georgia-schools-russia-in
-information-warfare/.
14      Ibid.
15      Tanya Erofeeva, “Georgia-Russia War: An Information Control Story,” Prezi, May 6, 2014,
https://prezi.com/i4fk4qprev0s/georgia-russia-war-an-information-control-story/; Matthew Mosk
and Jeffrey H. Birnbaum, “While Aide Advised McCain, His Firm Lobbied for Georgia,” Washington
Post, August 13, 2008; Mark Ames, “Georgia Gets Its War On . . . McCain Gets His Brain Plaque . . . ,”
The eXiled Online, August 9, 2008, http://exiledonline.com/georgia-gets-its-war-onmccain-gets
-his-brain-plaque/; and Levine, “CNN Effect.”
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information-psychological domains.16 Georgia won the hearts and
minds of the global community even though Russia won the physical
battlespace. The disinformation campaign was so successful that the
European Union’s final report on the crisis focused on US support and
military assistance to Georgia.17

2014 Crimea

In 2014, Russia created a similar situation with the region of
Crimea. Like South Ossetia, Crimea had a substantial Russian-speaking
population (approximately 58 percent at the time) and was generally
considered pro-Russian.18 Unlike South Ossetia, Crimea served as
Russia’s only year-round warmwater port, hosting a large portion of the
Russian military—the navy’s Black Sea Fleet.19

Information-Technical

Six years after the Georgian conflict, Russia applied the lessons
learned from the informational activities in Georgia to its efforts in
Ukraine. Although there is no evidence of dedicated “information
troops” in the Russian military who could directly engage in local and
regional areas yet, the innuendo reveals Russia is intent on learning from
its failures and fixing its problems.20 Russia also learned about timing
cyberattacks, which have long been considered a first-strike option for
maximum effectiveness, particularly against important targets such as
critical infrastructures.21
Unlike the concurrent digital attacks and military border crossing in
Georgia, cyberattacks against Crimea shut down the telecommunications
infrastructure, disabled major Ukrainian websites, and jammed the
mobile phones of key Ukrainian officials before Russian forces entered
the peninsula on March 2, 2014.22 Cyberespionage before, during, and
after Crimea’s annexation also leveraged information that could support
short-term and long-term objectives, a tactic that had not transpired,
was not reported, or went unnoticed against Georgia.
According to one security company, cyberespionage operations
employed simultaneously with other methods of information collection
appeared to accelerate battlefield tactics.23 Unlike in Georgia,
cyberespionage targeted the computers and networks of journalists
16      Thomas, “Russian Information Warfare Theory.”
17      Peter Wilby, “Georgia Has Won the PR War,” Guardian, August 17, 2008; and Independent
International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia, Report, vol. 1, (Brussels: Council of
the European Union, September 2009).
18      Associated Press and Reuters, “Everything You Need to Know about Crimea,” Haaretz,
March 11, 2014, http://www.haaretz.com/world-news/1.577286.
19      For more on Russia adding frigates to the fleet in early 2016, which further demonstrates the
strategic importance of Crimea, see Alexander Mercouris, “Russia Strengthens Its Black Sea Fleet,”
Duran (Cyprus), June 12, 2016.
20      Keir Giles, “Russia’s ‘New’ Tools for Confronting the West: Continuity and Innovation in
Moscow’s Exercise of Power” Chatham House, March 21, 2016, https://www.chathamhouse.org
/sites/files/chathamhouse/publications/research/2016-03-21-russias-new-tools-giles.pdf.
21      Cynthia Ayers, “Cyber Triggers and the First Strike Dilemma,” Mackenzie Institute, October
19, 2015, http://mackenzieinstitute.com/cyber-triggers-first-stike-dilemma/.
22      Azhar Unwala and Shaheen Ghori, “Brandishing the Cybered Bear: Information War and
the Russia-Ukraine Conflict,” Military Cyber Affairs 1, no. 1. (2015): doi:10.5038/2378-0789.1.1.1001.
23      Brian Prince, “ ‘Operation Armageddon’ Cyber Espionage Campaign Aimed at Ukraine:
LookingGlass,” Security Week, April 28, 2015, http://www.securityweek.com/operation-armageddon
-cyber-espionage-campaign-aimed-ukraine-lookingglass.
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in Ukraine as well as Ukrainian, North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO), and European Union (EU) officials. Exploiting such targets
could have provided Russia with insight into opposing journalistic
narratives as well as advanced knowledge of important of key diplomatic
initiatives. Operation Armageddon, for example, began targeting
Ukrainian government, law enforcement, and military officials in
mid-2013—just as active negotiations commenced for an EU-Ukraine
Association Agreement, which Russia publicly deemed a national
security threat.24
As in Georgia, nationalistic hackers, such as the Ukraine-based
CyberBerkut, also engaged in a variety of cyberattacks against Ukraine.
This group executed distributed denial of service attacks and defacements
against Ukrainian and NATO webpages, intercepted US-Ukrainian
military cooperation documents, and attempted to influence the
Ukrainian parliamentary elections by disrupting Ukraine’s Central
Election Commission network.25 While there is no evidence of collusion
or direction on behalf of the Russian government, the attacks did lend
to the overall confusion of the crisis, particularly for Ukraine, and
might be reflective of the Russian military embracing Russian General
Staff General Valery Gerasimov’s strategy on the future of warfare—
conflicts will retain an information aspect part of larger “asymmetrical
possibilities for reducing the fighting potential of the enemy.”26

Information-Psychological

Unlike Russia’s forceful invasion of Georgia, the contest over
Crimean territory was more of an infiltration. In the absence of a
direct threat, Russia relied on nonkinetic options such as propaganda,
disinformation, and denial and deception to influence internal, regional,
and global audiences. This reflexive control strategy—implementing
initiatives to convey specially prepared information to an ally or an
opponent to incline him to make a voluntarily decision predetermined
by the initiator of the initiative—explains Russia’s reliance on the
approach as an extension of information-psychological activities in
Ukraine during and after the Crimean crisis as well as the method’s
prominence in Russia’s information confrontation philosophy.27
More robust in Crimea than in Georgia, one scholar characterizes the
Russian approach to information confrontation as evolving, developing,
adapting, and just like other Russian operational approaches, identifying
and reinforcing success while abandoning failed attempts and moving
24      Jason Lewis, “Operation Armageddon: Cyber Espionage as a Strategic Component of
Russian Modern Warfare,” LookingGlass (blog), April 28, 2015, https://lookingglasscyber.com
/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/Operation_Armageddon_FINAL.pdf.
25      Petro Zamakis, “Cyber Wars: The Invisible Front,” Ukraine Investigation, April 24, 2014,
http://ukraineinvestigation.com/cyber-wars-invisible-front/; Unwala and Ghori, “Cybered Bear;”
and Agence France-Presse (AFP), “Hackers Target Ukraine’s Election Website,” Security Week,
October 25, 2014, http://www.securityweek.com/hackers-target-ukraines-election-website.
26      Valery Gerasimov, “The Value of Science Is in the Foresight: New Challenges Demand
Rethinking the Forms and Methods of Carrying out Combat Operations,” trans. Robert Coalson,
Military Review 96, no. 1 (January–February 2016): 23–29; and Mercouris, “Russia Black Sea Fleet.”
27      The Soviet Union first used the term reflexive control, but the systematic methods of shaping
an adversary’s perceptions, and thereby his decisions, to force actions favorable to Russia’s interests
is used today. See Can Kasapoglu, “Russia’s Renewed Military Thinking: Non-Linear Warfare and
Reflexive Control,” Research Paper 121 (Rome, Italy: NATO Defense College, 2015); and Timothy
L. Thomas, “Russia’s Reflexive Control Theory and the Military,” Journal of Slavic Military Studies 17,
no. 2 (June 2004): doi:10.1080/13518040490450529.
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on.28 A noticeable improvement from its efforts in Georgia, Russia used
television broadcasts to generate support for actions in Crimea and to
bolster the theme of Moscow’s necessary intervention to protect native
Russian speakers.29 Additionally, pro-Russian online media mimicked
anti-Russian news sources to influence opinion; for example, the website
Ukrayinska Pravda was a pro-Russian version of the popular and
generally pro-Ukrainian news site Ukrains’ka Pravda. The pro-Russian
sources would communicate false narratives about actual events, such as
denying the presence of the Russian military in Ukraine or blaming the
West for conducting extensive informational warfare against Russia.30
One significant lesson Russia learned from the Georgian conflict
was how pervasively the Internet could disseminate news from legitimate
and semiofficial organizations as well as personal blogs. Valdimir
Putin, the Russian president, acknowledged the role of the Internet in
influencing the outcome of regional conflicts and recognized Russia was
behind other governments in this space saying, “We surrendered this
terrain some time ago, but now we are entering the game again.”31 Russia
now supports journalists, bloggers, and individuals within social media
networks who broadcast pro-Russian narratives.32
In one case, Russia paid a single person to hold different web
identities, another to pose as three different bloggers with ten blogs, and
a third to comment on news and social media 126 times every 12 hours.33
Such Russian trolls may be crass and unconvincing, but they do gain
visibility by occupying a lot of space on the web. Arguably, “Russia’s new
propaganda is not now about selling a particular worldview, it is about
trying to distort information flows and fueling nervousness among
European audiences.”34
By adapting denial and deception strategies applied during the
Georgian conflict, outside interlopers remained confused during the
Crimean crisis. By denying involvement in the attacks until the later
stages of the conflict, Russia continued messaging its desire to de-escalate
the crisis while increasing chaos.35 Since the United States, NATO, and
28      Keir Giles, The Next Phase of Russian Information Warfare (Latvia: NATO Strategic
Communications Centre of Excellence, 2016).
29      Colin Daileda, “Could Russia Use Cyberwarfare to Further Destabilize Ukraine?,” Mashable,
April 14, 2014, http://mashable.com/2014/04/14/russia-ukraine-cyber-warfare/.
30      Sascha Dov Bachmann and Håkan Gunneriusson, “Russia’s Hybrid Warfare in the East: The
Integral Nature of the Information Sphere,” in “International Engagement on Cyber V: Securing
Critical Infrastructure,” special issue, Georgetown Journal of International Affairs (Summer 2015): 198–
211; and “ ‘Ukraine, West Wage Information War against Us’—Russians,” RT, November 12, 2014,
http://www.rt.com/politics/204827-ukraine-west-information-warfare.
31      Paul Goble, “Russia: Analysis from Washington—A Real Battle on the Virtual Front,” Radio
Free Europe/Radio Liberty, October 9, 1999, http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1092360.html.
32      Jill Dougherty, Everyone Lies: The Ukraine Conflict and Russia’s Media Transformation, Shorenstein
Center on Media, Politics and Public Policy Discussion Paper, #D-88 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
Kennedy School, 2014).
33      Bachmann and Gunneriusson, “Russia’s Hybrid Warfare.”
34      Alexey Levinson, “Public Opinion and Propaganda in Russia,” Stop Fake, July 29, 2015,
http://www.stopfake.org/en/public-opinion-and-propaganda-in-russia/.
35     Robert C. Rasmussen, “Cutting Through the Fog: Reflexive Control and Russian STRATCOM
in Ukraine,” Center for International Maritime Security, November 26, 2015, http://cimsec.org
/cutting-fog-reflexive-control-russian-stratcom-ukraine/20156; and Yuras Karmanau and Vladimir
Isachenkov, “Vladimir Putin Admits for First Time Russian Troops Took Over Crimea, Refuses to
Rule Out Intervention in Donetsk,” National Post (Toronto, Ontario), April 17, 2014, http://news
.nationalpost.com/news/world/vladimir-putin-admits-for-first-time-russian-troops-took-over
-crimea-refuses-to-rule-out-intervention-in-donetsk.
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the European Union could not predict Russia’s objectives, Russia could
leverage reflexive control to operate within Western decision-making
loops, to reduce the costs of its actions against Ukraine, and to keep
the United States and its allies out of the conflict. Once Putin admitted
the presence of Russian troops in Ukraine, he had already annexed
Crimea.36 Ultimately, the United States conceded Russian control of
Crimea and sent Secretary of State John Kerry to mitigate the threat of
further expansion into Ukraine.37
Noticeably improved, Russia’s strategic communications
proactively targeted pro-Russian rebels, the domestic population, and
the international community to alienate Ukraine from its allies and
sympathizers. Two key themes promoted the Ukrainian government
being anti-Russian Fascist and declared the Russian administration
would improve the population’s quality of life. Messages directed at the
rebels kept them engaged in the fight whereas messages to the domestic
population created moral justification for supporting the rebels and
conveyed the extant intermittent prospect of widespread combat
operations in eastern Ukraine.
Six years after the United States, NATO, and several European
governments sided with Georgia despite the attack on South Ossetia,
Moscow sought to mitigate Crimea’s external support via information
activities aimed at influencing foreign government actions. 38 Moscow
used pro-Russian media sources to spread photos of Ukrainian tanks,
flags, and soldiers altered to bear Nazi symbols in an effort to associate
the Ukrainian government with resurgent Nazism, and thereby
influence some European countries, such as Germany, to distance
themselves from Kiev.39
Another example involved disseminating images depicting columns
of refugees fleeing Ukraine to Russia, when in reality the people
commuted between Ukraine and Poland daily.40 Even cyberoperations
effectively leaked stolen information such as the phone conversation
between US Assistant Secretary of State Victoria J. Nuland and US
Ambassador to Ukraine Geoffrey R. Pyatt, which may have embarrassed
the United States.41

Russia’s Victory

While the larger struggle with Ukraine continues, Russia’s successful
and bloodless usurpation of Crimea testifies to the lessons learned in
South Ossetia. Russia’s information confrontation strategy was more

36      Bachmann and Gunneriusson, “Russia’s Hybrid Warfare”; and Karmanau and Isachenkov,
“Vladimir Putin.”
37      Paul Lewis, Spencer Ackerman, and Jon Swaine, “US Concedes Russia Has Control of
Crimea and Seeks to Contain Putin,” Guardian, March 3, 2014.
38      “Putin Slams U.S., Georgia’s Western Allies,” Truthdig, August 11, 2008, http://www
.truthdig.com/eartotheground/item/20080811_putin_slams_us_georgias_western_allies#below.
39      Unwala and Ghori, “Cybered Bear.”
40     Peter Pomerantsev, “Can Ukraine Win Its Information War with Russia?,” Atlantic, June 11, 2014,
http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2014/06/can-ukraine-win-its-information
-war-with-russia/372564.
41      Daisy Sindelar, “Brussels, Kyiv, Moscow React to Leaked Nuland Phone Call,” Radio Free
Europe/Radio Liberty, February 7, 2014, http://www.rferl.org/content/nuland-russia-eu-ukraine
-reaction/25256828.html.
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centralized and controlled in Crimea.42 Perhaps the most telling aspect
of success, Russia kept its biggest adversaries—the United States and
NATO—from intervening thereby enabling a referendum in which
the Crimean parliament voted to join Russia.43 While the West refuses
to acknowledge Crimea’s secession, Russia attests full compliance
with democratic procedures, a fact difficult to argue against on an
international stage.44
Despite marked improvements, Russia does not deserve all
the credit. Ukraine did not learn from Russia’s missteps and was illprepared to handle Russia’s cyber, media, and kinetic onslaught. With
a lack of funding and information outlets, there is also little evidence
of an aggressive Ukrainian counterinformation campaign. Historically,
Ukraine has maintained passive propaganda, public relations, and
lobbying practices and does not seem interested in changing.45 Even
since the Crimean independence referendum, Ukraine has not
proficiently mitigated Russian information confrontation. According to
one commentator, Ukraine “has no international voice or image” even
though the entire course of events—from the takeover of parliament in
Simferopol and dismantling of the Ukrainian military presence on the
peninsula to the disputed referendum and the de facto annexation of the
area to the Russian Federation—was accompanied by intense activity
aimed to control the flow of information.46

Ukraine Now

While one Ukrainian diplomat believes Ukraine is currently
winning the information war, possibly due to the European Union
maintaining sanctions against Russia, discontent with the sanctions
is growing among European Union citizenry, particularly in Greece,
Hungary, Italy, and perhaps most importantly, Germany.47 Furthermore,
the sanctions are not the result of Ukrainian information warfare efforts
as much as international perception of Russia as the aggressor state—a
view influenced by Russia’s annexation of the region and suspected
involvement in downing Malaysia Airlines flight MH17 (2014).48
What’s more, the longer Russia engages eastern Ukraine, the
more its objectives evolve. No longer entirely focused on inspiring
separatists in the region to rejoin Russia in a manner similar to Crimea,
Russia also seems to be combatting US influence in similar affairs

42      US Army Special Operations Command (SOC), “Little Green Men”: A Primer on Modern Russian
Unconventional Warfare, Ukraine 2013–2014 (Fort Bragg, NC: SOC, June 2015).
43      Luke Harding and Shaun Walker, “Crimea Applies To Be Part of Russian Federation after
Vote To Leave Ukraine,” Guardian, March 17, 2014, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014
/mar/17/ukraine-crimea-russia-referendum-complain-result.
44      Sputnik, “US Policy toward Crimea Defies Reality,” Russia Insider, March 16, 2015,
http://russia-insider.com/en/2015/03/16/4534.
45      Taras Kuzio, “Is Ukraine Really Winning the ‘Information War’ with Russia?,” Kyiv Post, July
18, 2016.
46      Pomerantsev, “Can Ukraine Win?”
47      RIA, “Parubiy: Ukraine Is Winning the Information War against Russia,” Fort Russ, July
2, 2016, http://www.fort-russ.com/2016/07/parubiy-ukraine-is-winning-information.html; and
Finian Cunningham, “Europe Revolts against Russian Sanctions,” Strategic Culture Foundation,
May 26, 2016, http://www.strategic-culture.org/news/2016/05/26/europe-revolts-against-russian
-sanctions.html.
48      Ibid.
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while trying to keep Ukraine out of NATO.49 Moreover, Russia has
demonstrated that obfuscating its true intent preserves its options while
confusing its adversaries.50
Hypothesizing over Russia’s true intent puts the advantage in its
hands. Leveraging flexibility brings beneficial resolutions—for example,
while assessing Syria in 2016, Russia’s aid to Assad’s forces successfully
stopped US-backed opposition. The United States adopted a quid pro
quo giving operational coordination against terrorist groups in exchange
for a Russian commitment to stop Syrian President Bashar al-Assad from
attacking Syrian civilians and the moderate opposition.51
This involvement made Russia equal partners in the region,
regardless of Assad’s return to power. Similarly, Russia may surrender
its short-term goals for eastern Ukraine to have autonomous rights in
favor of the strategic gain of Ukraine not joining NATO. Some believe
the economic burdens of eastern Ukraine may be too much for Russia
to take on.52 If true, using the region as a bargaining chip for the greater
prize serves Russia’s long-term objectives.

Information Confrontation—Evolutionary Thinking

Information warfare has been referred to as an asymmetric weapon,
and the incidents with Georgia and Crimea certainly support this
categorization.53 Following the Color revolutions, which resulted in
successful regime changes, both the Georgian and Crimean incidents
reinforce the belief that constructing, controlling, and disseminating
information effectively and substantially influences the outcome of
geopolitical events.54
Russia, generally perceived as one of the leading powers in
information warfare, lost its information struggle against Georgia,
the smaller country with less military capability and military history.55
Conversely, by applying an adaptive approach, Russia adjusted its
information confrontation strategy, successfully enabling Crimea’s
secession from Ukraine. Simply, Russia learned from its mistakes in
Georgia, centralized generation and dissemination of its information
and propaganda, and thereby subtly influenced Crimea’s final outcome.
As one Russian expert remarked, “When you look at how Russia is
attempting to copy Western style press briefings by the military . . . it
49      Matthew Chance, “What Does Russia’s President Putin Really Want?,” CNN News, February
11, 2015, http://www.cnn.com/2015/02/11/world/chance-putin-analysis/.
50      Maria Snegovaya, Putin’s Information Warfare in Ukraine: Soviet Origins of Russia’s Hybrid Warfare
(Washington, DC: Institute for the Study of War, September 2015).
51      Daniel R. DePetris, “America Has No Choice But To Cooperate with Russia in Syria,”
The Skeptics (blog), National Interest, July 18, 2016, http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-skeptics
/america-has-no-choice-cooperate-russia-syria-17027.
52      “Does Russia Really Want Eastern Ukraine?,” World Policy (blog), http://www.worldpolicy
.org/world-views/does-russia-really-want-eastern-ukraine.
53      James R. McGrath, “Twenty-First Century Information Warfare and the Third Offset
Strategy,” Joint Forces Quarterly 82, no. 3 (July 2016).
54      For more on the Rose Revolution (Georgia, 2012), the Orange Revolution (Ukraine,
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speaks volumes to their understanding of how better to structure public
opinion around a military operation.”56
Reviewing Russia’s information-related activities since the
2007 Estonia distributed denial of service incident, information
confrontation has evolved from a tool used primarily for disruption to a
tool of influence. The managing director for the Center of Security and
Strategic Research at the National Defense Academy of Latvia echoes
the sentiment by asserting influence operations are “at the very center of
Russia’s operational planning.”57 Indeed, the more nonmilitary means are
employed in areas of geopolitical tension, the more essential leveraging
information confrontation becomes. As information is generally
regarded as a soft power, it may be most effectively implemented in
times other than force-on-force military conflict where, depending on
its intent and objectives, information can be used to inform, persuade,
threaten, or confuse audiences.
Unsurprisingly, Russian writing on information confrontation
continues to evolve, a testament to the strategy being dynamic and fluid
much like the domain in which it is applied. While Gerasimov may have
helped redirect Russian military thinking about the role of nonmilitary
methods in the resolution of conflicts, other thought leadership builds
on the foundation. In 2013, two Russian authors acknowledged “a newgeneration war will be dominated by information and psychological
warfare that will seek to achieve superior control of troops and weapons
and to depress opponents’ armed forces personnel and population
morally and psychologically. In the ongoing revolution in information
technologies, information and psychological warfare will largely lay the
groundwork for victory.”58
The use of “new-generation war” nods to the criticality of information
dominance in a time where the content of information is as heavily relied
upon for civilian-military matters as well as the technologies it traverses.
Though new-generation war does not appear to have been used in military
writings since 2013, a lack of official refutation by military officers
suggests it may still be a relevant professional approach toward warfare.59
Many Western scholars have categorized Russian tactics in Ukraine
as hybrid warfare—the use of hard and soft tactics that rely on proxies
and surrogates to prevent attribution, to conceal intent, and to maximize
confusion and uncertainty.60 A 2015 article from Military Thought
suggests this interpretation of the events in Ukraine may be incorrect,
56      Mike Eckel, “Russia’s Shock and Awe: Moscow Ups Its Information Warfare in Syria
Operation,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Free Liberty, October 7, 2015, http://www.rferl.org
/content/russia-syria-shock-awe-military-air-strikes-information-warfare/27293854.html.
57       Tony Balasevicius, “Russia’s ‘New Generation War’ and Its Implications for the
Arctic,” Mackenzie Institute, November 10, 2015, http://mackenzieinstitute.com/russias-new
-generation-war-implications-arctic/.
58      Colonel S. G. Chekinov (Res.) and Lieutenant General S. A. Bogdanov (Ret.), “The Nature
and Content of a New-Generation War,” Military Thought 4 (2013).
59      Timothy L. Thomas, Russia Military Strategy: Impacting 21st-Century Reform and Geopolitics (Fort
Leavenworth, KS: Foreign Military Studies Office, 2015); and Timothy L. Thomas, “The Evolution
of Russian Military Thought: Integrating Hybrid, New-Generation, and New-Type Thinking,”
Journal of Slavic Military Studies 29, no. 4. (October 2016): 554–575, doi:10.1080/13518046.2016
.1232541.
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more accurately describing Western actions.61 In fact, by the end of 2015,
Russian officers altogether refuted the use of “hybrid” to describe their
activities.62 Nevertheless, the complementary and supportive role of
information confrontation in Ukraine suggests it is best implemented
in concert with other conventional and unconventional activities
to achieve maximum effectiveness in larger campaigns and not as a
stand-alone tactic.
In 2015, the director of the Russian General Staff’s Main Operation’s
Directorate explained a “new-type warfare,” similar yet distinct from
hybrid and new-generation warfare, that associates indirect actions
with hybrid ones.63 Other authors of new-generation warfare accepted
the new terminology, particularly for activities focused on military,
nonmilitary, and special nonviolent measures to achieve information
dominance, which logically includes actions in Ukraine. One author
stressed “information warfare in the new conditions will be the starting
point of every action now called the new-type of warfare (a hybrid war)
in which broad use will be made of the mass media and, where feasible,
the global computer networks (blogs, various social networks, and
other resources).”64
Unsuccessful attempts to place information confrontation under
the rubric of any specific modern war strategy, such as new-generation
war, hybrid warfare, or new-type warfare, may further testify to the
reciprocally dynamic and malleable nature of the strategy and conflict
activities. The one aspect consistently carried through official Russian
documents concerning information security doctrine and military
strategy and carried out in these regional conflicts is the belief that
information superiority is instrumental to future victories.
As the world moves toward conflicts in which, as Gerasimov
describes, “Wars are not declared but have already begun,” it is
evident that—whether referred to as information warfare, information
confrontation, information operations, or information struggle—no
state is guaranteed victory based solely on the abundance of resources
or capabilities. The art of information confrontation must be practiced
continuously, refined over time, and tailored to specific audiences.
Russia actively refines its methods in real-time conflicts as it
leverages and incorporates its information struggle into nonmilitary
means to achieve political objectives. In this way, Russia is not learning
from others as much as it is learning from itself and, in the process, leads
states’ conduct of such operations in the future. And, therein may lie
information confrontation’s greatest strength: there is no cookie-cutter
playbook from which it originates or to which it applies.
Information campaigns can be tailored to suite each unique
environment. The information campaign that worked in Crimea may
produce different outcomes elsewhere, which reinforces Russia’s lessonslearned approach—do not fight the next battle in the same way as the
61      Thomas, Russia Military Strategy.
62      Ibid.
63      Thomas, “Russian Military Thought”; and Timothy L. Thomas, Thinking Like a Russian
Officer: Basic Factors and Contemporary Thinking on The Nature of War (Fort Leavenworth, KS:
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64      Thomas, “Russian Military Thought.”
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last one. The greatest asset of this capability is the flexibility to assume
greater or lesser responsibilities given the nature of requirements, which
is paramount as the role of nonmilitary means to achieve political and
strategic goals in conflicts has significantly increased.

Recommendations

The United States needs to address hostile information activities
from its adversaries more efectively. As observed in the recent hacking
scandals surrounding the US presidential election in which Russia targeted
and, according to the US intelligence community, used information to
disrupt and ultimately help its candidate of choice to win, the soft power
most effective in confounding the United States is information itself,
and not necessarily any production or dissemination technology.65 Given
the fact that Russia spends approximately $400–$500 million per year
on foreign information efforts, while the US spends $20 million USD
on Russian language services, it is easy to see that the United States is far
behind.66 Some recommendations to address this shortcoming include:
National counterinformation strategy and center. The United
States’ offensive cybercapability is generally considered among the most
sophisticated and powerful on the planet; however, as observed in efforts
against the Islamic State, America has been less adept in countering
online messaging despite substantial resources.67
In late December 2016, President Barack Obama authorized $611
billion for the military in 2017 and to establish a Global Engagement
Center to track foreign propaganda and disinformation efforts
undermining US national security interests.68 Little information on the
development of this entity is available to date, although a similarly named
center focusing on Islamic State messaging is headquartered in the State
Department. Such a center should serve as a central, coordinating entity
as well as model the operations of the National Counterterrorism Center,
which maintains cross-government civilian and military representation
and directly advises the Director of National Intelligence. Furthermore,
this center needs to collaborate with national security stakeholders to
develop unique strategies for each state and nonstate actor.
Protect against fake news. The rampant proliferation of fake
news, such as observed during the US elections and annexation of
Crimea, undoubtedly plays a pivotal role in Russian information
operations.69 One initiative to help reduce fake news involves leveraging
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http://deaddrop.threatpool.com/rebooting-the-u-s-new-counter-messaging-efforts-against-isis/;
Eric Geller, “Why ISIS Is Winning the Online Propaganda War,” Daily Dot (Austin, TX), March 29,
2016; and Arturo Muñoz and Erin Dick, Information Operations: The Imperative of Doctrine Harmonization
and Measures of Effectiveness (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2015).
68      National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017, Pub. L. No. 114-328 (2016).
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cutting-edge technology to help identify the fabrications as soon as they
emerge. Artificial intelligence and data analytics can be used to detect
words or word patterns that might indicate deceitful stories. In addition,
the US government via the Department of Homeland Security should
implement a strategy for educating the public as well as identifying
and reporting fake news outlets in much the same way cyberscams are
reported to the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
International engagement. The global nature of the Internet
provides many outlets for disseminating legitimate and illegitimate
information. A myriad of social media platforms can also be used
to promote slanted news stories and propaganda via Internet trolls.
Increasing international collaboration among law enforcement and
intelligence professionals who specifically focus on these outlets will
help agencies identify and disable these sources.

Conclusions

Applying information warfare theories in today’s geopolitical climate
remains a work in progress. An around-the-clock news cycle and the
various ways of disseminating and consuming information worldwide
make implementing information-based operations and tailoring
messaging against competing narratives challenges. As observed in
Georgia, smaller nations can competitively control information and
influence target audiences to at least mitigate the efforts of, if not defeat,
larger nations.
Even after learning from its missteps in Georgia, Russia, did not
gain many Ukrainian regions. Russia lost opportunities in Luhansk and
Donetsk when Russian troops were unable to penetrate the regions
promptly. Russia, however, appears to be guided by Gerasimov’s
principle of refining information confrontation strategies by continuing
to engage in various forms of official and unofficial messaging as well
as perfecting the art.
One scholar of Russian propaganda refers to it as less of an information
war as much as a war on information. Given the value Russia places
on manipulating information, perceptions of the information space as
potentially dangerous and a successful agent for ousting governments
and influencing public opinion and behavior are understandable. A
former KGB general stated the overall goal of Soviet Union propaganda
was not far from the “subversion” pursued by Russia’s modern Internet
disinformation campaign: “active measures to weaken the West, to drive
wedges in the Western community alliances of all sorts, particularly
NATO, to sow discord among allies, to weaken the United States in the
eyes of the people in Europe, Asia, Africa, Latin America, and thus to
prepare ground in case the war really occurs.”
While the media has focused on offensive cyberattacks and disruptive
efforts to cripple critical infrastructures and to impede public access
to financial institutions and emergency services, Russia understands
the potential power associated with influencing via cyberspace. As
such, Russia continues to refine its online information operations
against regional and international targets, outpacing the United States
in nonoffensive cybercapabilities and demonstrating not all threats in
cyberspace are written in binary.

